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Abstract 
This paper challenges the focus on budget deficits that permeates the literature on fiscal policy. It 
analyzes countries running budget surpluses and asks why some of them preserved these surpluses 
while others did not. Whereas several OECD members recorded surpluses for just a few years, 
balanced budgets became the norm in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, and 
Sweden in the late 1990s. The paper compares the fiscal policy choices of both types of countries from 
a historical-institutionalist perspective. It argues that a path-dependent shift in the balance of power of 
fiscal policy interests explains why surpluses persisted in one group of countries but not in the other. 
This reconfiguration of interests was triggered by a deep fiscal crisis and an ensuing expenditure-led 
consolidation. It can be interpreted as creating a new “surplus regime”, in which fiscal policy became 
structured around the goals of balancing the budget and cutting taxes. 
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 1 
Introduction: budget surpluses in OECD economies 
 
It is, of course, widely recognized that surpluses are unlikely to arise from deliberate policy action 
in a democratic political setting. 
James Buchanan, 1967: 8 
 
The science of budget balances is a science of budget deficits. Internationally, news about fiscal policy 
is dominated by deficit crises, rating downgrades, debt ceiling disputes and other upheavals. The 
average indebtedness of OECD economies has more than doubled since the 1970s. Against this 
background, scholars of public finance have spent the last 40 years analyzing a “deficit bias” of 
representative democracies (Alesina & Tabellini, 1990; Buchanan & Wagner, 1977; Hallerberg, 
Strauch, & Von Hagen, 2009; T. Persson & Tabellini, 2003). The opposite case of budget surpluses 
received a short burst of attention in the late 1990s when the Clinton administration balanced the US 
budget for three consecutive years (Auerbach & Gale, 2000; Hassett & Hubbard, 1999; Posner & 
Gordon, 2001), but interest faded quickly when the US budget returned to a deficit in 2001. Apart 
from this brief exception, the literature has followed Buchanan‘s lead and regarded budget surpluses 
as empirically unlikely to happen and—in case they happened nevertheless—as being of minor 
theoretical interest (Alesina, 2000).  
This paper challenges the widespread neglect of budget surpluses. As Table 1 shows, this 
challenge can be justified empirically, as surpluses are a much more prevalent phenomenon than is 
widely assumed. To exclude one-off effects, I define a “surplus period” as a period of at least two 
years of continuing surpluses, which is interrupted by at most two deficits before the budget returns to 
surplus.1 Applying this definition to the three decades from 1980 to 2009 results in 18 surplus periods 
in 13 different traditional OECD economies (five countries show up twice).2 By contrast, only six 
traditional OECD economies (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal) recorded no 
surplus period over the entire three decades. While certainly less common than one would expect if 
budgets were balanced on average, surpluses are thus considerably more common than a Buchanan-
inspired intuition would suggest.  
Moreover, the challenge to the conventional focus can also be justified theoretically, as 
surpluses constitute “negative cases” (Emigh, 1997) which contradict dominant theories of fiscal 
policy. Specifically, they give rise to at least three different research questions: How they are created, 
how they are preserved, and how they are spent (on the latter see Haffert & Mehrtens, 2015). This 
paper will focus on the second question: how are surpluses preserved? This question has to be 
distinguished from the question how surpluses are created. Whereas surplus creation is a question of 
policy change—how to change fiscal policy to overcome a deficit?—, surplus preservation is a 
question of policy persistence, i.e. of non-change: how to prevent fiscal policy from changing again? 
The issue of persistence is of particular importance because many observers believe that 
consolidation successes are persistently threatened by “consolidation fatigue“(Von Hagen, Hallett, & 
Strauch, 2002: 517). Furthermore, the process of balancing a budget has already been thoroughly 
analyzed by a large literature on fiscal consolidation (Alesina & Ardagna, 2009; Guichard, Kennedy, 
Wurzel, & André, 2007; Wagschal & Wenzelburger, 2008). About persistence, however, we know 
much less, because the consolidation literature is predominantly concerned with the process of 
consolidation itself and not with its aftermath. Those studies that explicitly investigate the 
sustainability of consolidation efforts restrict themselves to a two-year (Alesina & Ardagna, 2012) or, 
                                                     
1 Thus, New Zealand had a single surplus period from 1994–2008, despite small deficits in 1998 and 1999. The reason to 
allow for such brief interruptions is that budget balances only become clear ex post. Therefore, planned surpluses 
sometimes turn into deficits because of unexpected events. 
2 This is after excluding Ireland, Luxembourg, and Norway, which all recorded persistent budget surpluses. However, the 
Irish surplus was an artifact of an overheating economy (the cyclically adjusted balance was in deficit most of the 2000s), 
while Luxembourg and Norway benefit from unique geographical/geological circumstances. 
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at most, a three-year window (Wagschal & Wenzelburger, 2008) for defining sustainability. In 
contrast, this study will analyze persistence on a much longer scale. 
 
 
 
Country  Surplus Period  Length of Period 
New Zealand  1994–2008  15 years 
Canada  1997–2007  11 years 
Finland  1998–2008  11 years 
Sweden  1998–2008  11 years 
Australia  1998–2007  10 years 
Denmark  1999–2008  10 years 
     
Japan  1988–1992  5 years 
Denmark  1986–1989  4 years 
Iceland  2004–2007  4 years 
Sweden  1987–1990  4 years 
Netherlands  2006–2008  3 years 
Spain  2005–2007  3 years 
United Kingdom  1999–2001  3 years 
USA  1998–2000  3 years 
Iceland  1999–2000  2 years 
Netherlands  1999–2000  2 years 
     
Finland  1980*–1989  10 years 
Switzerland  2006–2009*  4 years 
Table 1: Budget Surpluses in OECD Countries, 1980–2009; * data is censored 
 
 
The issue of persistence is of particular importance because many observers believe that consolidation 
successes are persistently threatened by “consolidation fatigue“(Von Hagen, Hallett, & Strauch, 2002: 
517). Furthermore, the process of balancing a budget has already been thoroughly analyzed by a large 
literature on fiscal consolidation (Alesina & Ardagna, 2009; Guichard, Kennedy, Wurzel, & André, 
2007; Wagschal & Wenzelburger, 2008). About persistence, however, we know much less, because 
the consolidation literature is predominantly concerned with the process of consolidation itself and not 
with its aftermath. Those studies that explicitly investigate the sustainability of consolidation efforts 
restrict themselves to a two-year (Alesina & Ardagna, 2012) or, at most, a three-year window 
(Wagschal & Wenzelburger, 2008) for defining sustainability. In contrast, this study will analyze 
persistence on a much longer scale. 
As Table 1 shows, the 18 surplus periods fall into two distinct groups with regard to their 
persistence. Six of them lasted for more than a decade (11.3 years on average). For want of a better 
term, I will call them “long” periods. These long surpluses developed largely in parallel in the mid- to 
late 1990s, and they all preserved their surpluses until the crisis of 2008. In contrast, in ten cases, 
surpluses were kept for a maximum of five years (and an average of 3.3 years). I will refer to these 
cases as “short” periods. These short surpluses are spread out over the entire period of investigation 
and correspond to peaks in the global business cycle.3  
The paper aims to explain this gap between the two groups of cases. Why did balanced 
budgets develop into long surplus periods in some cases but not in others? Although this question asks 
                                                     
3 I exclude Finland in the 1980s and Switzerland from the following analyses. Finland had been running persistent surpluses 
already since the 1950s in order to finance a state-driven industrialization effort (Vartiainen, 2011: 60). This approach 
changed fundamentally after 1990. The Swiss surplus started in 2006 but did not end in 2009, making the data right 
censored.  
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about the differences between the groups, it does not put the same emphasis on both of them. Whereas 
the ten cases of short surpluses generally conform to the received wisdom, the six long periods 
constitute a puzzle for any theory positing a general deficit bias. The empirical analysis will therefore 
concentrate on explaining their distinctiveness.  
Specifically, it will argue that these countries preserved their surpluses because a fiscal crisis 
and a subsequent expenditure-led consolidation triggered a persistent shift in fiscal policy interests. 
This shift can be described as a change of “fiscal regime” which led to the establishment of a new 
“surplus regime.” This regime was further entrenched by a tight fiscal reaction to adverse 
macroeconomic developments and by a credible commitment to use surpluses for funding tax cuts.  
In contrast, countries that did not preserve their surpluses followed a very different path: They 
did not experience a similar fiscal crisis, their consolidation relied much more on revenue increases 
and they reacted very differently to macroeconomic shocks. Surpluses were therefore not accompanied 
by a fundamental reconfiguration of fiscal interests and fiscal policy remained much more similar to 
that of countries with deficits. 
By tracing these differences the paper will show that democratic fiscal policies are not 
necessarily subject to deficit bias. Instead, they are characterized by strong path dependencies which 
can potentially give rise to very diverse outcomes. One such outcome is the persistence of surpluses 
within a “surplus regime”. This regime describes a temporarily stable configuration of the societal 
conflict about taxing and spending, in which tax cuts, while arithmetically being in conflict with 
balanced budgets, serve as a political complement to fiscal discipline. For the analysis of fiscal policy 
more broadly, this suggests not looking at different sides of the budget in isolation but focusing on 
their interplay instead. Furthermore, it shows that an overly voluntaristic view of fiscal policymaking 
underestimates how much the political room for maneuver is restricted by earlier policy choices and 
by the structural constraints which they created. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section compares a voluntaristic and a regime-based 
theoretical framework for analyzing fiscal policy and demonstrates how these approaches would 
conceptualize the persistence of surpluses. The empirical core of the paper then traces the differences 
between both groups through a multi-step process of fiscal crisis, fiscal consolidation, surplus 
persistence, and surplus spending. The final section concludes and discusses why it is justified to talk 
of a “surplus regime” in those countries where surpluses were preserved. 
 
Theory: voluntaristic and regime-based approaches to surplus persistence 
Because surpluses have received little attention in the literature, there are so far no direct attempts to 
explain the differences between long and short surplus periods. However, it is clear that the dominant 
approach in the literature, while sufficient to explain short periods, has a hard time dealing with long 
surplus periods. 
Most explanations of a deficit bias of representative democracies derive from the public 
choice tradition and rely on a conceptually individualistic and ultimately voluntaristic view of fiscal 
policymaking. In these models, policymakers face a certain set of incentives and try to maximize their 
own self-interest under this incentive structure. 
In this framework, the prediction of a deficit bias follows straightforwardly: The dominant 
incentive for policymakers is that tax cuts are popular, and so is higher spending. Tax increases, on the 
other hand, are unpopular, and so are spending cuts. Therefore, balancing the budget is not in the self-
interest of vote-seeking politicians. Specifically, fiscal policy can be plagued by a classical common 
pool problem, by problems of time inconsistency, by fiscal illusion, by the strategic use of debt to 
constrain future governments, by issues of intergenerational redistribution, by electoral cycles, and by 
many other problems which do not need to be reviewed in detail (for a recent summary see Alesina & 
Passalacqua, 2015).  
Regardless of the details, such a framework indeed predicts fiscal policy to be dominated by 
deficits. These deficits arise out of policymakers’ unrestricted pursuit of their self-interest, or, in other 
words, because they have too much discretion. The suggested solution therefore is to restrict 
policymakers’ room for maneuver by reforms of the budgetary process. Accordingly, economists and 
political scientists have proposed a host of formal institutional reforms, such as the introduction of 
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expenditure rules (Ljungman, 2008), the creation of fiscal councils (Calmfors & Wren-Lewis, 2011), 
the centralization of the budgetary process (Hallerberg, 2004), or binding coalition agreements 
(Hallerberg et al., 2009).  
Following this literature, countries that introduce such institutional reforms should be more 
likely to preserve their surpluses than countries that do not. However, this explanation begs the 
question why countries reform their institutional framework in the first place. Therefore, this literature 
is plagued by a perennial endogeneity problem (Debrun & Kumar, 2006). Very often, such reforms 
will be introduced by countries already committed to fiscal thriftiness. It is then unclear whether 
reforms are actually a cause or rather an effect of a fiscal policy change. 
This study proposes to analyze the persistence of budget surpluses on a much broader canvas 
and challenges the assumption of wide political room for maneuver. Relying on historical 
institutionalist concepts like policy feedback and path dependency, it rather sees political discretion as 
heavily constrained by past decisions and their consequences. The stability and persistence of policy 
choices has been at the core of the research program of historical institutionalism at least since Rose 
(1990). Important explanatory mechanisms developed in this literature can therefore be fruitfully 
applied to the question of surplus persistence. 
Specifically, a path-dependency approach to budget surpluses suggests looking for two crucial 
differences between the two groups of countries. Firstly, there must be a mechanism of surplus 
reproduction which keeps a country on its new path and developed in one group of countries but not in 
the others. And secondly, there must be a moment of change which sets a country onto this new path 
and which triggered the reproduction mechanism in some countries but not in others. 
Concerning the mechanism, such an approach has to spell out which constraints on the 
political room for maneuver developed in long surplus countries, and why these constraints generated 
strong pressures for preserving balanced budgets. In doing so, it can follow in the footsteps of the most 
comprehensive analysis of fiscal policy in a historical institutionalist spirit, undertaken by Paul Pierson 
(2001). Pierson developed the concept of a “fiscal regime” which he defined as  
“the configuration of political interests, institutions, and policy arrangements that structure 
conflicts over taxes and spending […] In utilizing the concept of a fiscal regime, I want to stress the 
connectedness of different aspects of the policymaking environment in a particular historical 
configuration” (ibid: 56–57).  
Following this approach, one can hypothesize that fiscal policy remained embedded in the 
existing fiscal regime in countries with short surpluses, while there was a change of fiscal regime in 
countries with long surpluses. Regime change is then a process in which transformations in one part of 
the regime are reinforced by transformations in other parts of the regime. For example, new ideas 
about the goals of fiscal policy trigger institutional reforms, these reforms feed back on the structure of 
political interests, political parties adapt their fiscal strategies to these new interests, and when they are 
in government, they introduce further institutional reforms. This process goes on until the crucial 
elements of the regime have reached a new structure of complementarities. By contrast, regime 
persistence is a process in which transformations in one part of the regime are counteracted by 
persistence in other parts of the regime and the preexisting complementarities remain in place. 
As fiscal regimes are characterized by complementarities, such a perspective suggests an 
enormous stability of fiscal policy choices. For explaining a transformation from persistent deficits to 
persistent surpluses, it therefore has to be complemented by a mechanism of regime change. Following 
the extensive literature on critical junctures (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007), this points to an important 
role for fiscal crises. A crisis may fundamentally question the established regime and thus create the 
“permissive conditions“ (Soifer, 2012) to overcome resistance against regime changing reforms.4  
Whether a crisis indeed forms a critical juncture will have to do with the specific 
circumstances of the crisis itself. However, it will also depend on the reaction to the crisis. Fiscal 
crises will trigger fiscal consolidation everywhere, but not every budget consolidation is equivalent to 
                                                     
4 On the role of crises for economic policy reform see also Drazen and Grilli (1993); Rodrik (1996); Drazen and Easterly 
(2001). More generally, this argument follows in the footsteps of Peacock and Wiseman (1961) and the literature on 
punctuated equilibria (Baumgartner et al., 2009). 
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a fiscal regime change. Most consolidation is just an adjustment within an existing regime. Only a 
consolidation in which “political interests, institutions, and policy arrangements” are transformed will 
have the long-term consequences implied by the regime concept. 
The proposition that the composition of a consolidation program affects its success and 
sustainability is a staple of the consolidation literature (e.g. Alesina & Ardagna, 2009, 2012). 
According to their results, consolidation relying on expenditure cuts is much more likely to succeed 
than consolidation relying on revenue increases. But why would expenditure-led consolidation be 
more likely to generate a change of fiscal regime? 
Following war-of-attrition models of fiscal consolidation (Alesina & Drazen, 1991), fiscal 
policy can be conceptualized as a conflict between two policy coalitions, one calling for higher 
expenditure and the other one calling for lower taxes.5 Expenditure coalitions will typically contain the 
beneficiaries of public redistribution and public services, but also their producers (i.e. public servants), 
and those domestically oriented sectors of the economy who benefit from an activist, anti-cyclical use 
of fiscal policy and who are comparatively sheltered from global tax competition. The partisan 
literature typically considers parties of the left as the political representatives of the call for higher 
expenditure (Franzese, 2002). By contrast, tax-cut coalitions will bring together the net-contributors to 
public redistribution, but also export-oriented sectors for whom deficit spending holds little promise 
but who see their fortunes threatened by international competitors who benefit from lower taxation in 
their home countries. Typically, parties of the right are considered to be the political representatives of 
lower taxes. A pivotal group, finally, are middle classes, which can potentially belong to both 
coalitions. In universalistic welfare states, they consume many public services and are therefore 
willing to support them. In more residual welfare states, however, they have to buy these services on 
the market and are therefore more supportive of tax cuts which increase their disposable income. 
In this framework, the relative political weight of the two coalitions is affected very 
differently by different types of consolidation. An expenditure-driven consolidation will weaken 
spending coalitions by making the welfare state more residual, but will leave tax cut coalitions largely 
unaffected. Those who have always demanded lower taxes will keep doing so while those whose 
public services have been cut are induced to develop private alternatives and to rely less on the state. 
A revenue-driven consolidation, by contrast, leaves spending coalitions largely unaffected but 
strengthens tax-cut coalitions. Those who pay higher taxes will join the ranks of the tax-cut coalition 
while no one is induced to leave the spending coalition.  
The political effects of revenue-led and expenditure-led consolidation are therefore highly 
asymmetric. Expenditure-driven consolidation will generate much stronger path dependencies and are 
much more likely to induce a fiscal regime change than revenue driven consolidation. 
 
Empirics: from deficit crisis to surplus regime 
The regime-based argument developed in the previous section implies that long surplus countries and 
short surplus countries were already on very different paths when they first balanced their budgets. It 
thus invites a long-term perspective which does not start with the surpluses themselves but with the 
fiscal crises and the consolidation that created surpluses. It furthermore suggests looking at the 
reconfiguration of strategic and material interests which were triggered by these events. The following 
empirical comparison of the differences between both groups will therefore pay particular attention to 
how fiscal events affected the strength and cohesion of spending and tax cut coalitions in the medium- 
and long term. 
The analysis starts with the fiscal conditions in the years preceding the surpluses. After that, it 
compares the consolidation efforts which balanced the budgets in both groups of countries. Thirdly, it 
looks at the institutional reforms undertaken during and after the consolidation. Fourthly, it compares 
the fiscal reaction to adverse macroeconomic developments, which were decisive for the preservation 
of surpluses. Finally, it looks at the evolution of tax policies during surplus years. The analysis of all 
five steps concentrates on the differences between and the commonalities within groups. Furthermore, 
                                                     
5 Barta (2011) argues that fundamental consolidation has to be understood exactly as such a rebalancing of societal forces. In 
its most general form, this argument goes back to Gourevitch (1986). 
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it focuses on countries with long surpluses, as they form the theoretically interesting “negative cases”. 
In doing so, the peculiar number of cases calls for a delicate balance between abstraction and detail. 
As the number of cases is too small for elaborate statistical tests, the section will focus on comparing 
group averages. At the same time, the number of cases is too big for a comprehensive treatment of all 
long surpluses. The discussion of group averages will therefore be illustrated by—necessarily 
selective—qualitative evidence which is not intended to give a full account of the development in all 
six countries, but rather to highlight the main mechanisms driving the observed results.  
 
Long surplus countries experience financial market pressures 
All six countries where surpluses would later be preserved experienced unique fiscal and 
macroeconomic difficulties in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Schwartz, 1994). They had all reacted to 
the macroeconomic upheavals of the 1970s with big public investment programs. These interventions, 
however, failed to produce the intended results but increasingly exhausted the fiscal capacity of the 
state. This led to serious fiscal crises in the late 1980s or early 1990s.6 
One symptom of these crises were high budget deficits and rising debt-to-GDP-ratios. Yet, 
deficits also grew in many other countries and headline numbers were even worse in Belgium, Italy, or 
Japan. What distinguished countries with long surpluses was not the absolute size of their problems 
but the rapid deterioration of their situation. They all started from a very strong fiscal position (the 
debt of all six countries was rated AAA in the early 1980s) and all lost the trust of financial markets 
during the crisis. 
 
Country Downgrade by 
Standard&Poor’s 
2σ hike of interest rate spreads 
Australia 02.12.1986: AAA to AA+ 
24.10.1989: AA+ to AA (neg) 
1986–87 
1989 
 
Canada 14.10.1992: AAA to AA+ 1990 
 
 
Denmark 06.01.1983: AAA to AA+ 
07.03.1985: AA+ to AA 
 
1982 
Finland 03.03.1992: AAA to AA+ 
11.03.1993: AA+ to AA- 
1990 
1992 
 
New Zealand 29.04.1983: AAA to AA+ 
02.11.1986: AA+ to AA 
22.01.1991: AA to AA- 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Sweden 22.03.1993: AAA to AA+ 1990 
 
   
Other OECD 
members 
/ / 
Table 2: Rating Downgrades and Interest Rate Spreads in OECD Countries, 1980–2000; source:Baldacci, 
Petrova, Belhocine, Dobrescu, and Mazraani (2011); Standard&Poor's (2011) 
 
This can be seen from two indicators of financial market pressure, namely credit ratings and interest 
rates on government bonds (Table 2). All countries where surpluses were preserved were downgraded 
in this period, and some of them several times. In contrast, no other OECD members were 
                                                     
6 These crises also show that persistent surpluses can hardly be attributed to a deep-seated cultural aversion to debt. Such a 
cultural argument cannot account either for the particularly strong increase of private debt in countries with permanent 
surpluses in the buildup of the 2008 financial crisis (Mc Kinsey Global Institute, 2015).  
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downgraded between 1980 and 2000 (Japan was downgraded in 2001).7 Furthermore, pressure did also 
arise from investors directly. Baldacci et al. (2011) define a fiscal crisis as a situation in which the 
spread between the interest rate on a country’s debt and the interest rate on US treasuries deviates by 
more than two standard deviations from its long-term average. With this operationalization, they 
identify a fiscal crisis in just six OECD economies between 1980 and 2007, which are exactly the six 
later surplus countries. 
While some countries with short surpluses also experienced deep fiscal troubles, in particular 
the Netherlands, financial market pressure did not become as acute in any of them. Rating downgrades 
and interest rate pressures thus provide an important first distinction between the two groups of cases. 
The existence of a fiscal crisis alone, however, does not yet explain why crisis countries would later 
preserve their surpluses.  
This, instead, has a lot to do with the psychological and political dimensions of the crises, 
which questioned the social and economic models of these countries fundamentally, in particular in 
the social democratic welfare states of Scandinavia (Lindbeck, 1997). The economic troubles caused a 
deep feeling of national crisis both among the population (Benner & Vad, 2000; Lewis, 2003; 
Nannestad & Green-Pedersen, 2008) and among economic and political elites (Fortin, 1996; G. 
Persson, 1996; Steinmo, 2002; Wenzelburger, 2010). This intense feeling of crisis was heightened by 
memorable moments in which the crisis culminated symbolically. These were sometimes economic 
events, for example when the Swedish central bank increased the overnight lending rate to 500 percent 
(sic!) to defend the exchange rate of the Krona (Mehrtens, 2014) or when a Canadian bond auction 
almost failed to attract the necessary demand (Palmer & Egan, 2011). More often, though, these were 
rhetoric moments which captured the crisis mood in a single, powerful image. Paul Keating’s 
diagnosis of Australia being in danger of becoming a “banana republic” (Schwartz, 1994), David 
Lange’s comparison of New Zealand’s economy to a “Polish shipyard“ (Goldfinch & Malpass, 2007), 
or the Wall Street Journal’s description of Canada as an “honorary member of the third 
world“ (Courchene, 2002: 23) are still quoted regularly today. 
One immediate expression of this crisis feeling were political upheavals. Sweden and Canada 
experienced so-called “earthquake elections” in which old parties demised and new parties rose (Arter, 
2012; Brede & Schultze, 2008). Furthermore, the continued existence of the Canadian federation was 
questioned by the Quebec referendum in 1995. New Zealand, in response to widespread voter 
discontent with the established parties, even fundamentally reformed its electoral system and replaced 
majoritarian voting by a German-inspired version of PR.8 While these upheavals had many causes, 
economic calamities played an important role, as cash-strapped governments were increasingly unable 
to use public funds to stabilize existing political alignments (Vowles, Aimer, Catt, Lamare, & Miller, 
1995; Weaver, 1992).  
These crises therefore triggered a fundamental reshaping of economic and fiscal priorities in 
all six countries. They clearly demonstrated that short-term adjustments of specific policies would not 
be enough and that fundamental reforms were necessary (Lewis, 2003; Mehrtens, 2014). Such reforms 
did not only fight the deficits but also created a new durable fiscal policy context in which the later 
surplus policies were made.  
 
Consolidation in long surplus countries is expenditure-driven 
In reaction to their fiscal crises, countries with long surpluses engaged in massive consolidation 
programs to reduce deficits and win back the trust of financial markets. Yet countries with short 
surpluses also undertook consolidation efforts that—while not being imposed by financial markets—
were sometimes quite sizeable. However, the composition of consolidation programs differed 
considerably between both groups.  
                                                     
7 Market confidence in Belgium and Italy had always been shaky, so these countries did not lose confidence they had enjoyed 
before. 
8 A reform that theoretically should have made the preservation of surpluses less likely. 
Lukas Haffert 
8 
As Figure 1 shows, budget consolidation in countries with long surpluses focused almost 
entirely on the expenditure side of the budget.9 In contrast, countries with short surpluses relied much 
more on increasing revenue. This is the case both when looking at the three years directly preceding 
the surplus and when looking at the entire consolidation, defined as the entire period in which budget 
balances improved. In addition, there was almost no difference with regard to economic growth in the 
three years preceding the surplus. While growth rates were generally high in both groups, they 
contribute very little to distinguishing preservation from non-preservation. Thus, countries with a long 
surplus did not simply enjoy highly beneficial circumstances. 
 
 
Figure 1: Composition of consolidation preceding budget surpluses10 
 
That consolidation programs in long surplus countries focused on the expenditure side of the budget 
had important political consequences. In particular, spending cuts weakened those interest groups that 
had traditionally fought for an activist state. This happened on two levels: Firstly, concerning the 
supply of public services, the state considerably reduced the number of its public servants. Public 
sector unions, a traditional stronghold of the labor movement, thus lost political influence. Between 
1990 and 2000, the share of public sector employees among all employees declined from 22% to 16% 
in Australia, from 23% to 19% in Canada, from 37% to 31% in Sweden and from 21% to 12% (sic!) in 
New Zealand (ILO, 2013). Only in Finland, it did hover constantly between 26% and 28% (no data for 
Denmark available). By contrast, the share of public employees remained constant in the US, whereas 
it first decreased and then increased again in the UK. 
Secondly, demand for public services was also seriously affected by the privatization of these 
services. Privatization could mean completely abolishing the public provision of certain goods and 
services or—more often—privatizing their production though not their financing. In this case, the state 
still paid for the service that was delivered by private suppliers. In both cases, however, supporters of a 
strong service state were weakened as public services acquired a more residual character and no longer 
included all social groups. 
The effects of such reforms are particularly visible in Sweden, which had always been 
regarded as the epitome of the social democratic service state (Huber & Stephens, 2000). In fields like 
elderly care, education, health, and child care, a substantial part of services is today delivered by 
                                                     
9 The narrative method of DeVries, Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2011) confirms this result for Australia, Canada, Finland, 
and Sweden. New Zealand is not part of their dataset, and the Danish case is somewhat ambiguous. According to their 
data, almost all consolidation efforts in Denmark happened in the 1980s (see below).  
10 Because of the small number of cases I show 90% confidence intervals. 
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private providers though financed by the state (Gingrich, 2011; Mehrtens, 2014). In a process of 
layering (Streeck & Thelen, 2005), these private structures have increasingly replaced classical state-
provided public services. Thereby, they allowed important constituencies to “exit” the public system 
and leave it and its problems behind (Schwartz, 1994: 530). Before the privatizations, these 
constituencies had to use “voice” to demand a political reaction to their discontent. Accordingly, 
increasing polarization about the goals of public education, as Fladmoe (2012) documents for Finland 
and Sweden, leads to more exit into private schools instead of a voice-based strengthening of the 
public system. 
Crisis and consolidation thus triggered a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy: They led citizens to 
expect cuts to public programs and thus to rely less on the state. For example, in a 1997 survey the 
large majority of Swedes expected that the public pension would not guarantee an acceptable standard 
of living and would have to be complemented with private insurance (Edlund, 2006: 399). The fact 
that citizens then invested in alternatives to state provision, in turn, made the expected cuts politically 
viable (Lewis, 2003: 162). Ex post, cuts then seemed to confirm how prescient it was not to rely on the 
state. 
The fact that citizens relied less on the state, however, did not mean that public programs 
became less popular in general. In some countries, the welfare state today is even more popular than 
before the crisis (Goul Andersen, 2008; Svallfors, 2011). To the confusion of scientific observers 
(Leigh, 2006), however, this popularity has not been translated into expansionary policies. This, again, 
points to the difference between policy change and policy preservation. While this popularity ensures 
that open retrenchment is almost impossible except in times of severe crisis, protection from 
retrenchment and support for expansion are two entirely different questions. After consolidation had 
succeeded, the debate in long surplus countries moved from retrenchment to selective expansion. Such 
an expansion, however, would have required an active support coalition, which is very different from a 
passive defense coalition that protects the welfare state. But this active coalition had lost large parts of 
its organizational capacities and its political clout during the consolidation (Lewis, 2003: 105f.; 
Schwartz, 1994: 530; Svallfors, 2015).  
Another important facet of the decline of expenditure coalitions in long surplus countries was 
that consolidation measures were pursued with the consent of all major parties, be it because 
governments depended on the support of the opposition (in Sweden and Denmark), because 
government changed hands during the consolidation (in Sweden, Finland and New Zealand), or 
because consolidation efforts of the central state were replicated by provincial governments of all 
stripes (in Australia and Canada). For example, the Swedish bourgeois government and the 
oppositional Social Democrats already agreed on several savings measures in 1992. From 1994 
onwards, the new Social Democratic minority government then relied on the support of the left party 
in some cases and on the agrarian center party in others. In Canada, the federal budget consolidation 
was pursued by a Liberal government while the opposition parties enacted very similar programs in 
Ontario (Progressive Conservatives),  Alberta (Reform Party), and Saskatchewan (New Democrats) 
(MacKinnon, 2003). 
As a consequence, almost all countries had governments which strongly defined themselves 
through the consolidation efforts. In Sweden and Finland, governments had been explicitly elected on 
the promise of consolidation; and in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, consolidation had quickly 
become their most important political project. Moreover, opposition parties could not credibly attack 
the governing parties for being too austere. Instead, they generally opted for a strategy of “difference 
minimization” and tried to present themselves as offering even greater fiscal responsibility (Battin, 
2002; Haffert & Mehrtens, 2014). This was particularly so when the main opposition party could be 
blamed for the financial troubles preceding the consolidation, as was the case in Australia or Sweden. 
Finally, expenditure-led consolidation efforts were also associated with a shift in the growth 
model of the respective economies. As many analysts have pointed out, successful consolidation 
benefitted enormously from increased export demand which cushioned the contractionary effects of 
expenditure cuts (e.g. Perotti, 2011). As Figure 2 shows, the cumulated share of imports and exports 
increased by more than 5% over the three years preceding the surplus in countries with long surpluses, 
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while it remained constant in the other countries. Moreover, the current account balance improved by 
0.4% in long surplus countries, whereas it declined by almost 2% in countries with short surpluses.  
 
 
Figure 2: Development of trade share in GDP during the consolidation. 
 
The export boom did not only help the economies of long surplus countries to deal with the 
consolidation, it also strengthened the political clout of export sectors. In these small open economies, 
export interests had always held a certain sway over fiscal policies. This sectoral cross-class coalition 
between capital and labor was now reinforced (Schwartz, 1994). Its members supported policies 
geared to increasing the economy’s international competitiveness, in particular by cutting taxes. In 
contrast, the biggest economies with surpluses—the USA, Japan, and the UK—, in which export 
interests played a smaller role, and in which tight fiscal policies are generally more difficult because of 
their bigger contractionary effects (Buti & Pench, 2004), all failed to preserve their surpluses. This, 
however, is also true of several small economies with surpluses, suggesting that the size of the 
economy is only one among several elements of the explanation. 
One long surplus country where this sequence of crisis and consolidation differed slightly is 
Denmark. The Danish crisis culminated already in the early to mid-1980s. Denmark then managed to 
run budget surpluses from 1986 to 1989, thereby inspiring the literature on expansionary fiscal 
consolidation (Giavazzi & Pagano, 1990), but did not preserve them (Nannestad & Green-Pedersen, 
2008). The reason was that these surpluses were not created by cuts to public expenditure but by 
revenue increases due to an economic boom. This boom, however, was driven by low interest rates 
and the wealth effects of rising house prices, but not accompanied by an expansion of the economy’s 
productive capacity. The OECD estimates economic output to have been four per cent of GDP above 
potential in 1986 (OECD, 2012).  
When the government introduced contractionary measures, referred to as a “potato cure”, the 
boom collapsed and the Danish economy entered a long phase of stagnation, from 1987 to 1993, 
during which the deficit again ballooned to almost four per cent of GDP. Thus, the surplus of the 
1980s is best seen as an element of an unfolding crisis sequence rather than an expression of fiscal 
policy success. Only the consolidation efforts of the 1990s, constructed around a set of “activating” 
labor market reforms (Benner & Vad, 2000: 450; Gaard & Kieler, 2005), managed to turn Danish 
public finances onto a more sustainable path. 
 
Budgetary institutions are reformed after consolidation succeeded 
As pointed out above, when public choice interpretations of fiscal policy look for tools to reign in 
democracy's deficit bias, they typically recommend reforms of the budgetary process. And indeed, 
many such reforms were introduced in countries where surpluses persevered. Table 3 is based on a 
recent IMF study (Budina, Kinda, Schaechter, & Weber, 2012) which catalogued four types of fiscal 
rules, namely balanced budget rules (BBR), debt rules (DR), expenditure rules (ER) and revenue rules 
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(RR). Unfortunately, this study only covers explicit rules and no other types of institutional reforms 
but it is the best comparative effort available.11 It shows a huge number of reforms in countries with 
long surpluses and a much smaller number in countries with short surpluses. Furthermore, the table 
distinguishes whether a rule was introduced before or after the budget was first balanced.12 Reforms in 
countries with long surpluses happened mostly after surpluses had already been achieved. In contrast, 
reforms in countries with short surpluses usually preceded the surpluses.  
On a first look, this strong correlation between institutional reforms and surplus preservation 
seems to confirm the public choice recommendation. Nevertheless, there are at least four reasons to be 
skeptical about a causal interpretation of this finding. Firstly, while the institutional reforms certainly 
point to a difference between both groups, this difference is likely to lie deeper, so that the reforms are 
its consequence and not its cause. This interpretation is supported by the timing of the reforms in long 
surplus countries. If anything, their effect was not to bring about a consolidation, but to codify an 
already achieved success. This distinguishes them from earlier attempts to fight deficits through 
institutional reforms. Neither the “expenditure framework” introduced by Denmark in 1984 
(Christiansen, 2008: 154), nor the Canadian “Spending Control Act” of 1991 (Blöndal, 2001), or the 
Finnish expenditure rules of the early 1990s (European Commission, 2003: 252) had been particularly 
successful. In contrast, governments generally complied with the rules of the late 1990s and early 
2000s. 
Secondly, none of these reforms included explicit sanctioning mechanisms. In many cases, 
reforms were not even codified. And where they were, as in New Zealand’s “Fiscal Responsibility 
Act” and Australia’s “Charter of Budget Honesty”, they did not contain enforcement mechanisms for 
punishing deviations from fiscal targets. Moreover, the targets themselves were defined in rather 
abstract terms like “reducing public debt to prudent levels” (Janssen, 2001). The specific 
operationalization of these targets was left to the government. These reforms were thus mainly 
political declarations which focused on transparency and accountability towards voters. In a public 
choice framework it is not clear why politicians should obey such a weak rule or why voters should 
punish them for not doing so. 
Thirdly, all surplus countries regularly beat their institutional targets. Hence, these targets did 
not really force political choices that would otherwise not have been made. To the contrary, 
governments sometimes pursued policies even tighter than demanded by the rules: “In practice, 
Sweden seems to have targeted a structural surplus of 2 percent of GDP which is an even tougher rule” 
(IMF, 2002: 4). The first conflict between Sweden’s new “Fiscal Council”, introduced in 2007, and 
the government arose about the fiscal reaction to the great financial crisis (Calmfors & Wren-Lewis, 
2011), when the council, remarkably, did not criticize the government for being too expansionary but 
rather for being too austere (Haffert & Mehrtens, 2015). 
Fourthly and finally, the single most important change in the budgetary process was not 
formalized at all, namely a tendency to base the budget on very pessimistic assumptions. Empirically, 
Frankel and Schrager (2013) find that most countries tend to make systematically over-optimistic 
forecasts of budgetary developments. As their data also show, however, the opposite is the case in 
long surplus countries, which systematically underestimated their surpluses.13 This persistent 
underestimation was no accidental result of positive macroeconomic surprises but was clearly intended 
(Janssen, 2001: 13; Kelly, 2002: 77; O'Neill, 2005). At the same time, it was emphatically not the 
consequence of any formalized pressure on governments. Quite the contrary, the literature generally 
assumes that institutional rules will induce over-optimism in official forecasting (Frankel & Schreger, 
2013). 
Taken together, these objections suggest that institutional reforms were not the exogenous 
cause of a fiscal policy change, but one of its endogenous elements. They expressed a consensus that 
                                                     
11 The European Commission provides a “fiscal rule strength index” but only for EU member countries. 
12 Admittedly a rough measure, as there is often a lag between the decision about a rule and its actual implementation. 
13 I thank Jeffrey Frankel and Jesse Schrager for sharing their data with me. 
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had already formed among key actors as a result of the crisis and consolidation experiences of the 
previous decade. When introducing institutional reforms to their national parliaments, ministers of  
 
 
Long Surpluses 
Country                Rules before     Rules during 
Short Surpluses 
Country                Rules before     Rules during
Australia                                              BBR 1998 
(surplus since                                      DR 1998 
1998)                                                     RR 1998 
Canada                                                BBR 1998 
(1997)                                                   DR 1998 
ER 1998 
Denmark                 BBR 1992            RR 2001 
(1999)                        ER 1994            BBR 2007 
ER 2007 
Finland                     DR 1995            BBR 1999 
(1998)                                                    ER 2003 
 
New Zealand                                      BBR 1994 
(1994)                                                   DR 1994 
 
Sweden                                                 ER 1997 
(1998)                                                  BBR 2000 
Denmark 
(1986) 
 
Iceland 
(1999) 
 
Iceland                                                  ER 2004 
(2004) 
 
Japan 
(1988) 
 
Netherlands            ER 1994 
(1999)                       RR 1994 
 
Netherlands 
(2006) 
 
Spain                       BBR 2003           BBR 2006 
(2005) 
 
Sweden 
(1987) 
 
United                     BBR 1997 
Kingdom                  DR 1997 
(1999) 
USA                           ER 1990 
(1998) 
Table 3: Institutional Reforms in Countries with Budget Surpluses 
 
finance made it very explicit that these reforms were a response to the preceding experience of crisis 
(Costello, 1996; Richardson, 1994). And also in countries where reforms were not legally codified, 
budgetary reforms seem to have been heavily influenced by the crises (Ljungman, 2008: 47). 
This does not mean that institutional reforms were irrelevant for the persistence of surpluses: 
They were important signaling devices which demonstrated a government’s determination to stay the 
fiscal course. Furthermore, they created focal points which defined success and failure and thereby 
structured the political debate. They certainly contributed to keeping fiscal policy on a new path, but 
they had not set it on this new path. 
 
A tight reaction to macroeconomic shocks ensures the persistence of surpluses 
The first years of budget surpluses were a time of good economic performance in all 16 cases under 
investigation. Tax revenue increased as the economy grew while welfare state expenditure declined as 
unemployment rates fell. Things began to change, however, when the economic booms, from which 
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the surpluses had benefitted so much, ran out of steam. Confronted with adverse macroeconomic 
developments, some countries managed to preserve their surpluses while others returned to a status of 
permanent deficits. While they had already been on different political paths, now their fiscal paths 
diverged as well.  
Unfortunately, the empirical analysis of this divergence is complicated by the fact that 
different shocks affect countries differently at different times. I will therefore not try to compare 
policy responses to different shocks over time. Instead, I analyze only one macroeconomic shock, 
which is the global downturn of 2001–03 in the aftermath of the bursting of the IT bubble. This 
unfortunately reduces the number of comparison cases to just four: Iceland, the Netherlands, the US 
and the UK. 
Figure 3 shows the development of cyclically adjusted revenue and expenditure in these four 
short and the six long periods between 2001 and 2003. It shows a clear difference in the discretionary 
fiscal reaction to the downturn. Countries with long periods were more reluctant to cut taxes and much 
more reluctant to increase expenditure. Adding up changes on the revenue and on the expenditure side, 
the fiscal stimulus provided by countries with short surpluses was more than three times as big as the 
stimulus provided by long surplus countries. 
Thus, only the former opted for explicitly expansionary fiscal policies. For the US government 
in particular, the recession even provided a welcome opportunity to repackage long since planned 
policies as necessary macroeconomic interventions (Morgan, 2009). By contrast, countries with long 
surpluses let automatic stabilizers do their work, but did not use discretionary measures to stabilize 
their economies. Where they introduced discretionary measures, these were often contractionary and 
designed to protect the surplus (Costello, 2008: 174; Lindh & Ljungman, 2007: 43).  
 
 
Figure 3: Fiscal reaction to the recession of 2001–2003; * Iceland, the Netherlands, UK, US 
 
Whether this tight approach was successful in economic terms is a disputed point. At least, it was 
certainly not dictated by fiscal necessities. If anything, these countries were in an even stronger fiscal 
position than the more interventionist countries with short surpluses: Several studies show that the six 
countries with long surpluses have comparatively low risks to fiscal sustainability (European 
Commission, 2006: 66; Ostry, Ghosh, Kim, & Qureshi, 2010), while pressures from the ageing of their 
societies are not larger than in other OECD economies (Merola & Sutherland, 2012; OECD, 2011). 
Thus, a more activist approach would have doubtless been affordable. 
Politically, however, the tight approach chosen was a big success. All six countries were able 
to overcome the recession in relatively good shape. For example, unemployment increased much less 
than expected. Thus, government politicians quickly claimed that their prudent fiscal approach had 
been responsible for the mildness of the recession (e.g. Goodale, 2004). In their rhetoric, surpluses 
turned from being an outcome of economic growth to being a precondition for economic growth. This 
redefinition, of course, could not happen in countries with short surpluses: Claiming that surpluses 
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were an engine of growth would have been a most damning verdict on their own expansionary fiscal 
policies. 
 
Surpluses are used for cutting taxes 
After the recession of 2001–03 had been overcome, the years before the world financial crisis were 
characterized by a strong macroeconomic environment in surplus countries which further strengthened 
their public finances. These beneficial economic conditions were underwritten by a resource boom in 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and, to a lesser extent, in Denmark, which caused a strong growth in 
tax revenues. As these countries had already preserved their surpluses through the recession of 2001–
03, a period of generally low resource prices, the resource boom increased surpluses, but did not cause 
them. Nevertheless, it gave an increased importance to the question of how the surpluses were to be 
spent.  
Progressive politicians had promised to use surpluses to increase public consumption and, 
more importantly, public investment. However, they failed to deliver on this promise. Instead, 
surpluses were mainly used for cutting taxes, independent of government partisanship (Haffert & 
Mehrtens, 2015).  
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Figure 4: Development of tax wedges in surplus countries; source: OECD (2014); * Iceland, the 
Netherlands, UK, US 
 
Figure 4 shows the development of the average tax wedge for singles with an income of 100% of the 
average in both groups of countries (no data prior to 2000 available).14 Long surplus countries reduced 
their tax wedge by almost four percentage points between 2000 and 2009. This corresponded with a 
substantial decline in total tax revenue which fell from 41.2% of GDP in 2000 to 38.4% in 2008 of 
GDP (cyclically adjusted revenue declined by 1.9% of GDP). By contrast, short surplus countries kept 
their income tax rates almost constant over the entire decade. As the preceding section has shown, 
these countries had enacted extensive tax cuts during the first years of surplus. After returning to 
deficits in the recession of 2001–03, however, they could no longer afford further tax cuts. 
To some extent, tax cuts were an economic strategy to raise the competitiveness of long 
surplus countries. As small open economies, they could benefit from international tax competition, as 
the ratio of lost revenue on the existing tax base to new revenue generated by increasing the tax base 
through attracting new investors was particularly favorable (Genschel & Schwarz, 2011). Furthermore, 
the consolidation had been accompanied by an increase in the economic importance of export sectors 
and thus of competitiveness concerns.  
                                                     
14 This wedge measures the difference between the gross wage that an employer pays and the net wage that an employee 
receives. 
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These concerns about competitiveness mainly inspired reductions of corporate taxes and 
income taxes. Cuts of the former were seen as attracting investors from abroad, but also as inducing 
increasingly footloose national companies to stay. For example, both the Swedish technology 
company Ericsson and the Finnish cellphone giant Nokia threatened to move their headquarters out of 
the country if taxes were not reduced (Helsingin Sanomat, 2001; The Economist, 2000). Similarly, 
income tax cuts were intended to prevent a “brain drain” of highly educated individuals. 
Consequently, official documents frequently highlighted the need for income tax rates that could 
compete with neighboring countries (Department of Finance Canada, 2004: 208; New Zealand 
Treasury, 2006: 44; OECD, 2000: 132). 
Even more important than these economic concerns were the political benefits of cutting 
taxes. Tax cuts were important for generating persistent support for continuing surpluses. The sheer 
existence of surpluses seemed to signal that citizens were overtaxed and deserved tax relief: In the 
wake of massive expenditure cuts, citizens paid more or less the same taxes as before but received 
substantially reduced public services. Against this background, governments typically argued that 
taxpayers paid for the surplus and thus had every right to share in its benefits. As Australian minister 
of finance Peter Costello put it succinctly: “Australian taxpayers are shareholders in Australia and they 
will benefit through income tax cuts as government debt is eliminated” (Gittins, 1999). 
Surpluses and tax cuts, while being arithmetic rivals—money that is used to balance the 
budget cannot be returned to taxpayers—were thus political complements. Persistent budget surpluses 
allowed politicians to credibly commit to future tax cuts because they guaranteed that such tax cuts 
could indeed be financed. At the same time, this promise to invest any surpluses in tax cuts ensured 
the support of those political interests which had been strengthened by the consolidation. Had they 
demanded bigger tax cuts in the present, this could have easily derailed the surplus policy. The 
promise of even bigger tax cuts in the future thus bought off their support for continued surpluses.  
The crucial question, of course, was the credibility of such a promise. How could politicians 
credibly commit to using surpluses for tax cuts in the future? As surpluses can only be spent for tax 
cuts or for expenditure increases, a commitment to cut taxes is equivalent to a commitment not to 
increase expenditure. And this commitment was made possible by the reconfiguration of political 
interests that had been triggered by the privatizations and expenditure cuts of the consolidation. Faced 
with a shrinking clout of spending coalitions, even parties of the left increasingly advocated for tax 
cuts. Political conflict between the major parties focused more and more on the composition of tax 
cuts and not so much on whether to cut taxes at all. 
Furthermore, the new budgetary rules acquired a surprising importance in this context. Instead 
of being the primary cause for the preservation of surpluses, their main effect was to influence the use 
of surpluses and to channel them into tax cuts. This is particularly clear in the case of expenditure 
ceilings, which prohibited the use of unexpected revenue for anything other than tax cuts or paying 
down the debt. Denmark even legislated a “tax freeze”, a legal ban on tax increases both in real and 
nominal terms, which ensured that measures to protect the surplus would always be undertaken on the 
expenditure side (Ministry of Finance Denmark, 2002). Canada went even further and introduced a 
“tax-back guarantee act” in 2007, which stipulated: “The Government of Canada shall apply any 
imputed interest savings resulting from reductions of federal debt to measures that provide tax relief 
for individuals” (Statutes of Canada, 2007). Continued surpluses would thus lead to automatic tax cuts 
by reducing the interest burden. 
To twist Margaret Levi’s famous argument (Levi, 1988), this can be seen as a “reverse fiscal 
contract”. Levi had argued that generating revenue was easier for governments who could credibly 
promise to use revenues for financing public goods. The promise of future returns in the form of 
higher spending would make citizens comply with taxes in the present. In a similar but reversed 
fashion, the promise of future returns in the form of lower taxes generated support for lower spending 
(i.e. continuing surpluses) in the present in surplus countries. 
 
Conclusion 
What Levi’s concept of a fiscal contract points to, is the deep political connection between fiscal 
decisions in the present and in the future. This interconnectedness between taxing, spending, and 
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budget balances is also what justifies speaking of a “surplus regime” in countries with long surpluses. 
Both how surpluses were spent as well as how they were created had an important impact on their 
preservation. Only countries that could credibly commit their surpluses to future tax cuts were able to 
preserve them. And only countries that generated surpluses through expenditure cuts were able to 
make such a commitment.  
In these long surplus countries, the coalition of interests that coalesces around the goal of 
lower taxes had been strengthened by a fiscal crisis and the following expenditure-led consolidation. It 
was therefore able to permanently shift the burden of fiscal adjustment onto the coalition that 
coalesces around the goal of higher expenditure, which had been weakened by the very same sequence 
of crisis and consolidation. “Political interests, institutions, and policy arrangements” (Pierson, 2001) 
thus became structured around the double-goal of balancing the budget and cutting taxes.  
Countries with short surpluses, by contrast, remained stuck in a deficit regime. In these 
countries, there was no similar crisis and only a much less fundamental consolidation. Consequently, 
the underlying societal conflict between both coalitions was temporarily alleviated by surprisingly 
strong revenue growth, but was never really solved. As soon as the underlying economic boom ended, 
the conflict arose again and deficits returned. 
This regime-based approach has implications not only for the analysis of budget surpluses but 
for the study of fiscal policy more broadly. It calls for attention to the specific historical circumstances 
in which fiscal policies are made and questions the validity of sweeping generalizations, including the 
prediction of a permanent “deficit bias”. In particular, such an approach shows the limits of a 
voluntaristic conception of fiscal policy in which policymakers are essentially free to pursue their 
individual interests and in which their room for maneuver has to be restricted by formal institutional 
barriers. As I have argued, both the creation and the efficacy of such barriers crucially depend on the 
underlying fiscal interests which support them.  
Moreover, while institutional reforms are endogenous with regard to underlying fiscal 
interests, these interests themselves are shaped by prior fiscal policy choices in a path-dependent 
fashion. As the analysis has demonstrated, the specific composition of consolidation programs set in 
motion a realignment of interest structures. Thus, fiscal policy is not just an outcome but also a source 
of the relative strength of different coalitions. Accordingly, the analysis of fiscal policy should not just 
take into account how interest structures restrict the political room for maneuver, but also how fiscal 
decisions feed back on the content and weight of specific interests. 
This is of particular importance at those junctures where established fiscal policy regimes get 
into trouble and the topography of fiscal interests begins to shift. The most recent example of such a 
juncture, of course, is the fiscal response to the great financial crisis and, in particular, the euro crisis. 
Many analyses of these crises focus on the more immediate questions of fighting deficits, reassuring 
financial markets and restarting economic growth. The theoretical framework adopted in this paper, 
however, suggests that the long-term consequences of different policy options are as important as their 
immediate effects. The decisions taken in response to the crisis are likely to define the path for fiscal 
policy for many years to come. What the specific feedback effects of different policy choices will be, 
however, is difficult to foretell. Future research should therefore analyze path dependencies in fiscal 
policy on a much more systematic scale, in order not just to identify them ex post but also to anticipate 
them ex ante. 
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Appendix: Development of Fiscal Indicators in Long Surplus Countries as 
Percent of GDP 
 
Figure A.1: Budget Balance  
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Figure A.2: Net Public Debt  
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